

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P R 260700Z APR 75  
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2581  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0175

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 25, 1975  
(SALT TWO-632)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 25, 1975.

QUOTE:

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 25, 1975

WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO WORKING OUT A JOINT  
DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDER-  
STANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION  
WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SOME  
RELATED PROBLEMS.

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UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH MUST BE BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AND THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, THE SIDES WILL BE ENTITLED TO HAVE CERTAIN AGREED EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH SETS FORTH THE SPECIFICS OF THIS PROVISION, STATES THAT DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT EACH SIDE WILL BE ENTITLED TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS, NOT EXCEEDING 2,400 UNITS.

IT IS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN JURIDICALLY PRECISE PROVISIONS WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WOULD RECORD SPECIFICALLY WHAT TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE ESTABLISHED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400 STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS. THE SIDES HOLD A COMMON VIEW REGARDING THE NEED FOR SUCH PROVISIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE STATES THAT THIS AGGREGATE NUMBER INCLUDES LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) LAUNCHERS, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM) LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS, OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE NOT OVER 600 KILOMETERS.

THE DISCUSSIONS HELD SHOW THAT THERE IS NO LACK OF UNDERSTANDING HERE TO THE EFFECT THAT SLBM LAUNCHERS AND LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WILL BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER (2,400) BEING ESTABLISHED. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 CLEARLY INSTRUCTS US TO INCORPORATE THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE INTO THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ALSO, THERE IS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HERE ON ALSO INCLUDING HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER. AT THE SAME TIME, ONE CAN SEE ATTEMPTS AT WRONG INTERPRETATION OF THE PERFECTLY CLEAR PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE THAT "WHEN A BOMBER IS EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH

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MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER (2400) OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES." THIS FORMULATION LEAVES NOT A SHADOW OF A DOUBT THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, BEING STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, MUST INCLUDE PRECISELY ALL MISSILES OF SUCH RANGE, INCLUDING CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PERMIT A DEVIATION FROM THE CONTENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN VLADIVOSTOK, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ASSERTION THAT SUPPOSEDLY ONLY AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS MUST BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION.

THERE CAN BE NO GROUNDS AT ALL FOR A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION. MOREOVER, IT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED HERE, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THIS AGAIN, THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTES A COMPLEX OF LIMITATIONS WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY ENSURE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COMPLIES WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. AN ARBITRARY APPROACH TO ANY ELEMENT OF THIS UNDERSTANDING WOULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. BUT, IT IS PRECISELY THIS, THAT THE DELEGATIONS ARE CALLED UPON TO AVOID IN CARRYING OUT THE TASK PLACED BEFORE THEM. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY IS THE UNSHAKABLE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AND, STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE MAKES IT CLEAR THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM INCLUDE, AS FOLLOWS UNAMBIGUOUSLY FROM THE TEXT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, ALL MISSILES OF THAT TYPE.

AS FOR DEFINING THE HEAVY BOMBERS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER, WE ALSO CANNOT DEVIATE FROM THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY AIRCRAFT; FOR THE U.S., B-52 AND B-1; FOR THE USSR, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV,  
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AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE B-1 BOMBER. THE SOVIET SIDE REAFFIRMS THIS POSITION. IT IS PRECISELY NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY AIRCRAFT WE ARE DEALING WITH, HENCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TERM "TYPE" IS UNFOUNDED. THE SOVIET SIDE AGAIN DECLARES THAT THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO INCLUDE THE AIRCRAFT OF THE U.S. SIDE CALLS BACKFIRE IN THE CATEGORY OF HEAVY BOMBERS. IT IS NOT A HEAVY BOMBER, AS HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY U.S. OFFICIALS, TOO, AND CONSEQUENTLY IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATION AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT BY JOINT EFFORTS, GUIDED BY THE DECISIONS REACHED IN VLADIVOSTOK, THE DELEGATIONS WILL BE ABLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE

FORMULATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS ENUMERATED, FOR INCLUSION  
IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. WORK IN THIS AREA  
IS PROCEEDING AND, WE UNDERSTAND, WILL BE CONTINUED.

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P R 260700Z APR 75  
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2582  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0175

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## II

WITH REGARD TO INCLUDING IN THE JOINT DRAFT OF  
THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT PROVISIONS FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE  
REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS  
EXPRESSED ITS CONSIDERATIONS AT THE APRIL 8, 1975  
MEETING, WHEN SUBSTANTIATING THE FORMULATIONS OF  
ARTICLE XVIII OF THE FEBRUARY 1, 1975 DRAFT.

THE SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON INCLUDING  
AN APPROPRIATE ARTICLE ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE JOINT  
DRAFT AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION EXERTS PERSISTENT EFFORTS SO  
THAT POLITICAL DETENTE BE REINFORCED BY DETENTE IN THE  
MILITARY SPHERE AND USED FOR REDUCING ARMAMENTS AND

ENSURING PROGRESS IN THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT. WE  
WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THE UNDERSTANDING  
ON QUESTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, ACHIEVED IN  
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VLADIVOSTOK AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU  
L.I. BREZHNEV AND U.S. PRESIDENT GERALD FORD, IS VIEWED  
IN THE SOVIET UNION AS HAVING ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE.  
IN HIS SPEECH OF APRIL 22, 1975 IN MOSCOW, SPEAKING  
OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN L.I. BREZHNEV  
AND HEADS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF A  
NUMBER OF WESTERN STATES, M.A. SUSLOV, MEMBER OF THE  
POLITBUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU,  
EMPHASIZED: "THE SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED  
WAS CROWNED WITH A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS,  
AMONG WHICH AN IMPORTANT PLACE IS HELD BY THE SOVIET-  
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON FURTHER MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION  
OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS." THIS WAS ALSO  
EMPHASIZED AT THE APRIL 1975 PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU.

BEING IN ITSELF AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE QUANTITA-  
TIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS, THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST LEAD TO A FURTHER LIMITA-  
TION AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF THESE ARMS. PARAGRAPH 6  
OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 CLEARLY  
INDICATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL ALSO INCLUDE A  
PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT NO LATER THAN 1980-81  
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND  
POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS. OF COURSE,  
THE FORMULA "NO LATER THAN" ALSO MEANS THAT A BEGINNING  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE  
REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS EVEN EARLIER THAN 1980-  
1981 IS BY NO MEANS RULED OUT. THE CORRESPONDING  
FORMULATION OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE FEBRUARY 1, 1975  
DRAFT REITERATES THIS UNDERSTANDING REACHED.

### III

ARTICLE XVII OF THE FEBRUARY 1, 1975 DRAFT PROVIDES  
FOR AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO ASSUME ANY  
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH  
THE NEW AGREEMENT.

DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION  
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OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION WERE SET FORTH BY THE USSR DELEGATION IN ITS STATEMENT OF APRIL 4, 1975. WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT INCLUSION OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS IN THE TEXT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS IS A CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE PRESENCE OF PROVISIONS ON THIS SCORE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STRENGTHENING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND ITS UNDOUBTED INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT A CORRESPONDING PROVISION BE INCLUDED IN THE JOINT DRAFT.

IV

MR. AMBASSADOR,

ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING THE APRIL 2, 1975 MEETING, THE U.S. DELEGATION EXPRESSED INTEREST THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985 CONTAIN A SPECIAL ARTICLE WITH DEFINITIONS OF SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS THOROUGHLY STUDIED THIS PROPOSAL. IN ITS STATEMENT OF APRIL 15, 1975 THE USSR DELEGATION EXPRESSED A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION ON THIS SCORE.

IN DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SOVIET INITIATIVE I HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A PROPOSAL ON ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

ON LAND BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS:

"LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS (ICBM LAUNCHERS) ARE LAUNCHERS OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE NORTHWESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE NORTHEASTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S."

ON SLBM LAUNCHERS:

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"SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS (SLBM LAUNCHERS) ARE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS INSTALLED ON NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS OF MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILES FIRST FLIGHT TESTED SINCE 1965, WHICH ARE INSTALLED IN ANY SUBMARINE REGARDLESS OF TYPE."

THIS FORMULA APPROPRIATELY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT

PAST DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA ON THIS QUESTION.

ON HEAVY BOMBERS:

"HEAVY BOMBERS ARE NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY AIRCRAFT; FOR THE U.S., B-52 AND B-1; FOR THE USSR, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE B-1 BOMBER."

ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KM.:

"AN AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS IS ANY MISSILE OF THIS TYPE, INSTALLED IN A BOMBER OR ON ITS EXTERNAL MOUNTINGS."

THIS DEFINITION ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD HERE.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT CONSTRUCTIVE STEP TOWARD THE POSITION OF THE U.S. SIDE ON THE CORRESPONDING QUESTIONS. IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

CONSIDERING THE SHORT TIME REMAINING BEFORE THE WORKING RECESS, IT SEEMS ADVISABLE TO REFER THE QUESTION OF THESE DEFINITIONS TO THE KARPOV-KLOSSON GROUP FOR WORKING OUT AGREED FORMULATIONS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO ADDRESS SOME OTHER QUESTIONS RELATED TO WORKING OUT A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. UNQUOTEJOHNSON

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